In a dataset of weekly observations over the period since 1990, the discount on UK closed-end mutual funds is shown to be nonstationary, but reverting to a nonzero long run mean. Although the long run discount could be explained by factors like management expenses etc., its short run ‡uctuations are harder to reconcile with an arbitrage-free equilibrium. In time series terms, they appear to exhibit heavily nonlinear behaviour, perhaps best represented by an Exponential Smooth-Transition Autoregressive (ESTAR) model.
Introduction
On the whole, anomalies in …nancial markets tend to melt like snow ‡akes almost as soon as they are examined closely. The phenomenon of the discount on closed-end mutual funds is di¤erent in this respect, as well as a number of others. After decades of published academic work on the UK and US markets, discounts show little sign of shrinking, and in fact at the time of writing this paper, still average more than 11% in the UK. This is true in spite of the fact that no entirely rational explanation for the mispricing has ever been found, while all the obvious explanations have been eliminated. Among the factors which have been adduced as possible explanations have been management expenses and holdings of illiquid or unquoted securities (Ingersoll (1976) , Malkiel (1977) for USA, Draper and Paudyal (1991) for UK), tax liabilities on unrealised capital gains 2 (Malkiel (1977) , (1995) ) and, as far as country funds are concerned, asymmetric information (Frankel and Schmukler (2000) ). Most of these would-be explanations have since been discredited, or at least shown to be no longer relevant. 3 However, in an important recent contribution to this debate, Gemmill and Thomas (2002) (henceforth G-T) rationalise the long run level of the discount in terms of the cost of arbitrage, though even they are unable to explain its short run deviations without relying on the idea of noise traders motivated by market sentiment, 2 Note that in the UK no tax is levied on the capital gains made by closed-end mutual funds.
3 For a survey of the literature, see Dimson and Minio-Kozerski (1999) .
3 thus con…rming the views originally put forward by DeLong, Schleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990) and Lee, Schleifer and Thaler (1991) . 4 Rather than seeking directly to explain the apparent anomaly in pricing behaviour, this paper approaches the problem from a di¤erent angle, instead revisiting the problem of modelling the underlying time series processes for evidence consistent or inconsistent with the explanations o¤ered in the literature. The data analysed relate to UK closed-end funds (Investment Trust companies or ITC's), which make up a larger and more diverse market sector than their equivalent in the USA, 5 the subject of most of the published research. Previous time series analysis of this market established that price and net asset value (NAV) were cointegrated, but that the cointegrating vector was probably not (1, -1) and that the discount tended to follow a distinct characteristic pattern over the life of a fund (Chen, Copeland, O'Hanlon (1994) ). This paper …rst con…rms that, while price and NAV are both I(1) variables, the discount is in most cases nonstationary, at least once we allow for the possibility of noninteger orders of integration. In fact, estimation of ARFIMA models suggests that for most ITC's the discount tends to be nonstationary, but mean-reverting around 4 This paper is exclusively concerned with the discount in the secondary market. No attention is given to the well-known anomaly in the pricing of initial public o¤erings of investment trust companies (e.g. Levis and Thomas (1995) ). 5 The value of the total assets of the UK ITC sector is about £ 40bn. G-T cite …gures to show there were more than 3 times as many closed-end funds in the UK than the USA in the 1990's.
a level of about 15%. As a proximate explanation of this behaviour, it is shown by simulation that these results are consistent with a random walk within the bounds estimated by G-T by direct methods i.e by computing actual costs of arbitrage. Finally,
evidence is produced to demonstrate that ITC discounts adjust to shocks in a nonlinear fashion, and estimates are computed for the smooth-transition autoregressive (STAR) class of models which have been shown to provide an adequate representation of the time series characteristics of a number of other …nancial variables, including exchange rates and index futures. The results of …tting both exponential (ESTAR) and logistic (LSTAR) models are presented, and it is found that the former model provides a better explanation of the time-series pattern of ITC discount behaviour.
The …rst section of the paper introduces the dataset and its properties. The following section presents the results of stationarity tests on price, NAV and the discount. Estimates of the fractional root d are given in Section 3, and an interpretation is o¤ered in the next section. The paper ends in Section 5 with estimates of nonlinear adjustment processes consistent with the results presented in preceding sections.
Throughout the paper, the variables of interest will be the logs of price and net asset value, p = ln(P) and v = ln(V), so that the premium is de…ned as q = log Plog V. 6 The text here follows market convention and much of the published literature 6 In the UK market, the premium is de…ned as (P-V)/V, the practice followed by G-T among others. This may be less problematic for cross-section work, but it has drawbacks in a time series context. For example, while it is possible to test the premium de…ned in this way for stationarity, it 5 in dealing with the discount (i.e. the negative of the premium, -q), but all data in the tables is given in terms of the premium, so that smaller numbers imply a greater discount.
The Dataset
The dataset used in this paper consists of weekly Wednesday market-closing prices for closed end mutual funds, known in the London market as investment trust companies (ITC's). In most cases, the data start at 05/05/90 and end 12/05/04, a total of 735 observations, but the dataset includes a number of funds which ceased trading before the end of the period, though none provided fewer than 500 observations. Out of the …gure of 300 quoted by G-T as the number of closed-end equity funds listed in
London at some point in the 1990's, 134 are included in the present study. The oldest and largest funds in the industry are included, in particular the venerable Foreign and Colonial founded in 1868 and with a current NAV of over £ 2bn, but also a substantial proportion of smaller and/or newer funds, though none launched later than mid-1989. As far as investment portfolios are concerned, the ITC's invest overwhelmingly in ordinary shares, though some have small holdings in other assets, notably preference shares, bonds, real estate etc. Geographically, no attempt has creates a problem interpreting tests for cointegration between P and V. Also, using the log de…nition, the change in the discount can be straightforwardly decomposed into the price return and net asset value return.
6 been made to distinguish between funds investing in UK and those investing in other parts of the world. 7 All data are taken from Datastream.
8
The salient facts about the dataset can be seen in Table 1, which documents clearly what is perhaps the most remarkable fact about the UK closed end mutual fund market: the sheer pervasiveness of the discount. Far from being a temporary aberration, the discount is a more or less permanent feature of the ITC market. In a sample of 134 observed over 735 weeks, the typical (i.e. median) ITC traded at a mean discount to net asset value of 13%, ranging from a maximum premium of only a little over 5% to a maximum discount of 30%. Moreover, the discount was highly variable, with a typical standard deviation over the period of 7.2%. The asymmetry is striking, insofar as every single ITC share went to a discount at least once during the period, but more than a quarter of companies never once traded at a premium to NAV, and in fact only four out of 134 traded at a premium on average over the 15 years.
7 By default (i.e. unless they speci…cally commit to investing in a single country or region) British funds usually diversify internationally. In that respect, the industry could be said to regard the UK as simply another national market, so that ITC's restricted to investing in the UK are e¤ectively treated as country funds. Whether or not the same country fund paradox is observed in the UK ITC sector as in the USA (see e.g. Bodurtha, Kim and Lee (1995) or Levy-Yeyati and Ubide (2000)) is a question not pursued here. 8 In fact, the sample consisted of more or less all the funds covered by Datastream and trading at the start of the period in 1990.
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In summary, the dataset here displays the same basic characteristics which have become familiar from the large literature on USA and UK closed-end funds published in the last twenty years, with no apparent evidence that the well-established anomalies are being eliminated.
Arbitrage Bounds and the Long Run Discount
This persistence is remarkable, given that the largest ITC's are extremely liquid, and that the situation is well known to researchers in both the academic and practitioner communities. In order to carry the analysis further, the approach taken here involves breaking down the phenomenon into two components: the long run equilibrium level of the discount, and the short run ‡uctuations around that level.
A number of papers address aspects of the market situation which could justify the existence of a long run discount. The most convincing argument in this regard is that the computation of NAV overstates the present value on which shareholders have a claim in two respects. First, there is a continual leakage of value into costs, whether in the form of management charges or in more general agency costs. Secondly, ITC's typically pay dividends, further depleting the asset value in the fund. If we make the assumption that both of these items are a constant proportion of NAV (which is not completely unrealistic in this context), then it is straightforward to show (see Ross (2002) ) that the equilibrium price implies a long run discount given by the ratio:
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where is the management/agency cost as a proportion of NAV, and y P is the dividend yield paid by the ITC. In practice, most of the components of the long run equilibrium given in (1) are unobservable. For example, although explicit management fees are usually …xed in advance, other cost factors (e.g. nominee account fees) are more variable, both over time and possibly across investors. More importantly, the expected dividend yield is uncertain. Nonetheless, Ross (2002) and G-T o¤er back-of-the-envelope estimates of this equilibrium discount for the USA and UK respectively, arriving in both cases at a …gure in the 10% to 15% range, which is broadly consistent with their datasets and with the results given in Table 1 , as well as with the results of formal time series analysis, as will be shown in the next two sections.
If arbitrage were costless, arbitrageurs might have been expected to prevent any persistent deviation from this long run equilibrium. However, as G-T make clear, there are nonnegligible costs to the types of transactions required to exploit mispricing in this market (see also Ponti¤ (1996) ). For example, in the most common scenario, the underpricing could be exploited in a number of ways, most simply by buying the 9 The approximation is due to the fact that the Ross (2002) presentation has been translated into logs for consistency with the de…nition of the premium used in the rest of this paper.
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underpriced ITC stock while simultaneously shorting the underlying portfolio. This transaction undertaken at time 0 would yield an expected pro…t of:
where T is the time period over which the arbitrage position has to be maintained, r L and r B are lending and borrowing rates respectively, and y V , y P are dividend yields on the underlying portfolio and the ITC stock respectively. 10 The term in square brackets will almost invariably be negative, since borrowing rates are usually greater than lending rates, 11 and the dividend yield on ITC stock is in most cases lower than on the market as a whole. It follows that, when an ITC is underpriced, the elimination of arbitrage opportunities requires that the discount be greater in absolute terms than the net cost of carrying the position for T periods.
There are a number of obstacles to implementing this arbitrage strategy, however.
In the …rst place, it may not always be possible -and may be extremely costly -to take a short position in the ITC portfolio, though of course it is likely to be easier the more closely the portfolio mirrors one of the market indices, especially if a liquid 10 This is more or less the same equation as in G-T, translated here into continuous time to be consistent with the de…nition of the premium in terms of logs. 11 This actually understates the case, since the e¤ ective lending rate is likely to be further reduced in practice, because the proceeds of short sales are not normally made fully available to the seller.
futures contract is available to provide cheap replication. In general, replication will be cheaper the higher the beta of the ITC portfolio.
Perhaps the most obvious and in practice most important problem is that the length of time, T, over which the arbitrage position will need to be held is ex ante unknown. In theory, a perfect capital market will only price this uncertainty insofar as it covaries with the market return, a possibility which will be discussed later.
In reality, with default risk and de facto limits on lines of credit often imposed on arbitrageurs by their own institutions, it is likely to be a serious obstacle. This is especially so as the arbitrageur entering the market at time 0 cannot be sure that the discount will not actually widen at any point in time t, 0 < t < T.
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Stationarity
Given that discounts are apparently nonzero, both in the short and long run, one might at least expect price and NAV to be cointegrated, so that the discount adjusts over time to the unknown (and unobservable) equilibrium value given in (1). In 12 Note the comparison with a (rational) bubble, in which the price is above its equilibrium level, as de…ned by the fundamentals, but short-selling is never pro…table until the ultimate collapse, because the price carries on rising at an exponential rate su¢ cient to compensate speculators for the risk that the bubble may burst during their holding period. Of course, we cannot invoke the same mechanism here, since ITC prices are in most cases below their equilibrium levels, and a rational bubble cannot be negative, because the price itself cannot fall below zero. (Diba and Grossman (1988) ).
other words, it might reasonably be argued that price and net asset value can hardly diverge without limit. Shocks to the discount ought to be reversed eventually, so that, invoking the Granger-Engle Theorem, the price would adjust to the previous period's discount along the path implied by the error correction mechanism towards its long run level.
On the face of it, this approach looks unpromising in the present context, given the asymmetry between discounts and premia observed in this dataset. In fact, this pessimism is clearly justi…ed, as can be seen from here, the conclusions with regard to price and NAV are unambiguous. Plainly, as anticipated, they are both I(1), since we can decisively reject stationarity of p=log(P), v= log(NAV) in levels, whereas we have no reason to reject the null that p and v are I(0).
In contrast, the results for the premium de…ned as q = ( p -v) are ambiguous.
On the one hand, the value of the KPSS statistic overwhelmingly suggests rejection of the I(0) null in almost every case. On the other hand, the Philllips-Perron test results in the majority of cases indicate rejection of I(1). In fact, the median P-P statistic of -3.5 falls just below the 1% rejection level for the I (1) null, and in the vast majority of cases we reject a unit root at the 5% level.
On the face of it, these results appear to broadly consistent with those of Cheng, Copeland and O'Hanlon (1994) , who looked for evidence of cointegration in a broadly similar population of UK ITC's and reached the conclusion that the long run discount was plainly nonzero. However, the option of looking for cointegration between unit root variables is not one pursued here for two related reasons. First, the standard approach of looking for cointegration between price and NAV (as in Cheng, Copeland and O'Hanlon (1994) ) is likely to yield an estimate of the long run relationship involving not only a nonzero intercept but also a slope coe¢ cient signi…cantly di¤erent from unity. While the former result is easy to interpret (e.g. in terms of equation (1)), and in fact is entirely consistent with the other results reported in this paper, the latter is far more di¢ cult to understand. It is hard to see why ITC stock prices should fail to respond one-for-one to changes in NAV even in the long run. 13 Secondly, as already pointed out, the balance of the evidence suggests the discount is probably not an I(0) process in most cases, so that even if p and v are cointegrated, the cointegrating vector is certainly not (1, -1).
Long Memory Tests
13 Cheng, Copeland and O'Hanlon (1994) , working with logs of price and NAV, interpreted the nonhomogeneity as re ‡ecting a life-cycle pattern in the discount, increasing at …rst in the early years following the ‡otation of a fund and subsequently falling back as it matured.
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If we were to restrict ourselves to the two polar possibilities that discounts are either I(0) or I (1), we would have to conclude that, not only are long run discounts nonzero, they also show no tendency to settle at any particular level, and shocks to discounts tend to persist inde…nitely, with no tendency to reversal as time passes. These are not, however, the only two possibilities. One possible interpretation of the results in Table   2 is that discounts are actually long memory processes, in the fractional integration sense of Granger and Joyeux (1980) i.e. that discounts contain a component for which the degree of integration is neither 0 nor 1, so that they can be described as
Following this line of approach, Table 3 shows maximum likelihood estimates of the ARFIMA model:
where u t D(0; 2 ) is an error term which is assumed in most cases to follow a Student's t distribution, in order to allow for the fact that the data exhibit far fatter tails than is consistent with Gaussian normality, (L); '(L) are polynomials in the lag operator, and the fractional di¤erence operator is de…ned by:
where the b i are given by:
It should be noted that, in this context, 0 < d < 0.5 implies stationarity, while 0.5 < d < 1 indicates nonstationarity, but mean reversion. The choice of model was based on the Akaike Information Criterion, subject to the overriding requirement that the residuals be nonautocorrelated, as evidenced by the Box-Pierce statistic.
14 A number of points emerge from these results:
1.
As anticipated, there is strong evidence that d > 0 in all but 5 cases. Even if one took the failure of the numerical estimation process to converge as evidence against long memory, we would still have to conclude that d = 0 could be rejected (at the 5% level) in at least 125 cases out of 134.
2.
In about 20% of cases, it was impossible to reject a unit root i.e. d =1 .
3.
The median value of d = 0.75 indicates nonstationarity, but also mean reversion.
4.
There were only 8 cases in which the estimated value of d < 0.5 was consistent with stationarity.
5.
For the typical ITC, the intercept estimate was -0.15, implying a long run discount of 15%. At the same time, in about 25% of cases, the hypothesis that the true value of the intercept is zero could not be rejected.
14 As can be seen from Table 3 , in a few cases it proved impossible to …nd an ARFIMA model (at least, of order (4,d,4) or lower) su¢ cient to capture all of the autocorrelation in the residuals.
There were also four cases of nonconvergence. All models were estimated using James Davidson's TSM Version 4.05 software.
In general, the interpretation of these results is not straightforward. The implication is that discounts follow a long memory process, which is nonstationary but mean-reverting, so that shocks last for an extended period, but are ultimately eliminated as the discount returns to its long run level. The latter, however, is most often not zero, as would be implied by a naïve market e¢ ciency view.
In fact, the median 15% long run discount emerging from these ARFIMA estimates is strikingly close to the G-T estimate of 12.0%, as the required compensation for cost loading on ITC portfolios along the lines set out in equation (1). Broadly, the results given here support their view that we actually have two puzzles in need of an explanation. First, why is there a nonzero long run discount? Second, why do disturbances to the discount persist so long? Having rationalised a nonzero discount with reference to expense ratios etc, how can one further explain a readjustment process in the aftermath of a shock as protracted as is implied by the results given here?
The results reported here are only partly consistent with the scenario of an arbitrage cost-determined bound within which the ITC price may ‡uctuate in response to random shocks caused by day-to-day imbalances between purchases and sales. Instead, the results in Table 3 suggest that prices are certainly not con…ned to these bounds, and that when random shocks occur, the reversal takes many weeks and in some (unit root) cases is never expected to happen.
However, the key to a reconciliation may lie in noting two points. First, by considering additional factors over and above the arbitrage costs taken into account in equation (2), G-T ultimately derive a sequence of ever wider channels within which they claim that discounts are con…ned in the long run. The time series evidence reported in Table 3 can be reconciled with their analysis in the context of a model of a bounded random walk, the long memory implications of which are explored in Copeland and Zhu (2004) .
In a possible time series representation of the G-T scenario, let us take net asset value as exogenously …xed at any moment, and suppose that, given this level of NAV, the maximum and minimum possible price of the ITC share is determined by factors which are only partly observable: arbitrage costs, management fees, open-ending costs etc. Now if, within these limits, the price (and hence the discount) ‡uctuates randomly under the impact of shocks to net demand, the outcome could be a bounded random walk process:
where q,q are lower and upper bounds on the discount respectively, and " t is a zeromean IID series. This process is a random walk until it hits either the upper or lower bound.
As already noted, if there are bounds in the present case, they are not directly ob-servable. What then would be the outcome of taking a standard time series approach to modelling this series i.e. treating it as an unbounded process? Figure 1 shows the results of an experiment involving …tting a fractional di¤erence process to a series generated by the random walk (6), subject to successively wider bounds. The shocks " t are 1000 drawings from the standard normal distribution at each bound, where the bounds are measured in standard deviations on the horizontal axis. Experiments with non-Gaussian shocks generated results that were qualitatively similar, and, in the relevant region, extremely close numerically to those given here.
As can be seen, the resulting estimates are biased downward along a smooth curve, so that the narrower the bound, the lower the estimated value (Copeland and Zhu (2004)). So, for example, a random walk between bounds of one standard deviation in either direction would mimic an autoregressive process with a coe¢ cient of 0.61 or a fractional di¤erence process with root d = 0.49. Viewed in this light, the median estimate of d = 0.75 in Table 3 is consistent with bounds set at approximately two and a quarter standard deviations either side of the mean, or just under +/-18% in the median case.
15 Interestingly, this is quite close to the estimate of a 35% range of variation in the discount given by G-T, who adopted a totally di¤erent approach, based on the di¤erent types of cost associated with arbitrage operations in this market.
The Adjustment Mechanism
The evidence given in the previous section is obviously not the end of the story. It is merely suggestive of the possibility that the underlying ITC price process may be characterised by some form of nonlinearity generated by arbitrage limits or, conceivably, by other factors as yet unknown. While the nature of the nonlinearity is not immediately obvious, a hint can be found in G-T's characterisation of ITC pricing.
In their words, the option of open-ending limits the discount, so that "like a spring under tension, the further it is pushed, the more strongly it recoils." (p. 2575)
While this picture could be consistent with a number of nonlinear adjustment models, the most likely candidate seems to be the class of Smooth Threshold AutoRegression (STAR) models, which makes its appearance in the economics literature in two forms, Exponential (the ESTAR model) and logistic, LSTAR.
There are a number of reasons to entertain this class of models. First, the ES-TAR model has been shown to provide an adequate representation of the adjustment process for several …nancial variables, notably the real exchange rate (e.g. Michael, Nobay and Peel (1997), Taylor, Peel and Sarno (2001) ) and the basis in the index futures market (Taylor (2003)). Secondly, in the present context it seems highly likely that the bounds analysed in detail by G-T are binding on investors at di¤erent levels.
For example, even in the absence of capital market imperfections, the borrowing and lending rates appearing in equation (2) are unlikely to be the same across agents with heterogeneous credit ratings, access to capital and information. Moreover, unless expectations are completely homogeneous, estimates of the prospective dividend yields are likely to vary across investors, as also are anticipations with respect to the holding periods required, T. This is particularly true in cases where the payo¤ from arbitraging an underpriced ITC stock is dependent on open-ending, the timing of which is likely to be especially hard to predict. 16 Thirdly, given that arbitrage involves the uncertainties in equations (1) and (2), among others, the return to arbitrage will involve a risk premium, unless none of these factors covaries with the market return, which seems improbable. For example, if, as seems highly likely, most potential arbitrageurs have a …nite maximum holding period, whether as a result of credit market constraints or other factors, they will require compensation for the risk of having to liquidate early. The risk associated with premature liquidation is clearly related to the market as a whole, …rst, because the higher the market, other things being equal, the higher the ITC share price, and secondly because it is well known that open-ending is more common in periods when the market is buoyant. 16 One major reason for expecting costs to vary across arbitrageurs is that there are plainly cost advantages available to the ITC management itself. Even if it is prevented from trading in its own stock or has no cost advantage in doing so, it can open-end far more cheaply than an outside arbitrageur, who must …rst gain control of the ITC before being able to proceed.
20
For all these reasons, we would expect that, the further the price from net asset value (i.e. the greater the premium or discount to fair value), the higher the proportion of investors who would view the reward to arbitrage as great enough to cover the expense and associated risk. The ESTAR mechanism captures this e¤ect in what amounts to a three-regime setting. In terms of the ITC premium, we postulate the following:
where x t is a vector of exogenous and/or predetermined variables, usually including a constant, and are parameter vectors, and the critical adjustment function is in square brackets. Stability requires that 0, with a zero value implying linearity.
At one extreme (the "outer regime"), the adjustment function has a maximum value of one, when (q t d c) ! 1 i.e. when the discount d periods back is a long way above or below its long run equilibrium level, c (which may possibly be the equilibrium described in (1)). The delay d could in principle take any value up to the maximum order of lagged dependent variable in the x t vector. In practice, most papers assume d = 1, in which case equation (7) reduces to a simple autoregression, possibly augmented by exogenous variables in x t :
In this limiting case, adjustment is at its most rapid, possibly instantaneous, if the RHS above reduces to a random walk i.e. if the elements of and corresponding to q t 1 sum to unity.
At the other extreme, as (q t d c) ! 0, the adjustment function tends to zero, so that the inner regime (when the discount is in the neighbourhood of c) is characterized by the alternative autoregression:
In general, stability in the middle region requires 0, and we anticipate a value for c signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, almost invariably negative, with a conjecture that for most ITC's the long run value will not be far from the unconditional mean given in As already mentioned, this model has been extensively applied to a number of economics variables, most notably to real exchange rates. Its applicability in the present context needs to be explored, but it is not the only candidate. Whereas asymmetric 17 A polynomial time trend might be justi…ed, given the well-known tendency for discounts to vary with the age of the ITC (Copeland, O'Hanlon and Cheng (1994) ) but in most cases it added little to the explanation. In any case, Paya and Peel (2003) cast doubt on the reliability of estimates of ESTAR processes with trends. adjustment in exchange rates seems a remote possibility, it certainly cannot be ruled out a priori in the present context, since there are a number of elements to arbitrage costs which may be di¤erent for buyers and sellers.
Consider again the two sides of the arbitrage involved here. On the one hand, when price is above NAV, the arbitrageur needs to short sell the ITC share while simultaneously buying the underlying portfolio or a proxy, in the form of an index futures contract, an ETF 18 or maybe a (fairly priced) index fund. On the other hand, when, as is usually the case, the price is at a discount to NAV, the arbitrageur has to take a short position in the portfolio while buying the stock. Comparing the two situations, it is not at all obvious that transaction costs, broadly de…ned, will be the same. For example, if the portfolio is not a good match to the market so that the use of proxies is ruled out, the costs involved in creating a short position are unlikely to be the same as the costs of going long. Moreover, in the longer term open-ending a mutual fund to eliminate a discount will cost more than simply issuing more shares to exploit a premium.
The implication is that asymmetric adjustment is a possibility which needs at the very least to be entertained. The obvious alternative to ESTAR in this regard is the 
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This model di¤ers from ESTAR in allowing for three, rather than two regimes. Instead of simply an inner and an outer regime, we now have an inner regime, and two outer regimes depending on whether the premium is above or below its long run level.
Speci…cally, in the neighbourhood of long run equilibrium, we have:
which is the autoregression de…ning the inner zone.
As far as the two outer regimes are concerned, note that we continue to assume that 0 : It follows that, in the upper regime, when q t 1 0 ! +1, we get:
On the other hand, in the lower regime when the premium is a long way below its long run level i.e. when q t 1 0 ! 1, the model reduces to:
As far as model selection is concerned, Escribano and Jorda (1999) 
x t is the vector of pre-determined variables appearing in linear form, which means here the lagged values of q t in the second term on the RHS of (7) and (8 In Table 4 Results of …tting the two models are given in Tables 5 and 6 . In both cases, model selection involved choosing the best-…t from among alternatives with m,n no greater than 4, on the basis of AIC subject to the residuals being nonautocorrelated. In every case, this resulted in all j = 0 j 1. Looking at the ESTAR results in Table   5 …rst, the estimates share certain characteristics. First, the nonlinear adjustment coe¢ cient, , is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero and correctly signed (i.e positive) in every case. Secondly, the restriction n X j=1 j = 1 can only be rejected for Invesco, which suggests that in the remaining three cases the discount process in the inner regime is indistinguishable from a random walk. On the other hand, for these three ITC's the outer regime re ‡ects only the long run level of the discount (of 9%, 13% and 16% respectively) plus any random shocks.
The case of Invesco is slightly di¤erent. The inner regime appears to be a nonstationary process (the autoregression coe¢ cient is signi…cantly greater than 1.0), and the long run discount is estimated as 33% -more than double the sectoral mean, and nearly double its own unconditional mean (see Table 1 ). On the whole, the result con…rms the test conclusion from the previous table that the ESTAR model is not the preferred choice in this particular case.
It turns out, however, that the LSTAR model fares little better for Invesco, as can be seen from Table 6 , with an estimate of the adjustment coe¢ cient, , which is insigni…cantly di¤erent from zero. In fact, for the LSTAR model, this parameter, though correctly signed in every case, is signi…cant only for Witan. Moreover, the F-test results for a random walk in the inner regime suggest acceptance in only two out of four cases.
Overall, it would have to be concluded that, if these ITC's are representative of the population as a whole, the ESTAR model dominates LSTAR, suggesting asymmetry is less relevant than might have been expected a priori. Since there is some evidence of autocorrelation remaining in two of the series, it may be that the number of lags entertained is inadequate, though the very fact of so many lags being required may tell us something of the speed of adjustment in this market. Alternatively, it could be the case that the nonlinearity in the processes is best represented neither by ESTAR nor LSTAR, but by some as yet unspeci…ed third model.
Conclusions
This paper has examined the time series properties of the discount rate on UK ITC's, con…rming the results of Cheng, Copeland and O'Hanlon (1994) and G-T that, if there is cointegration between price and net asset value, it is not a relationship implying a zero long run discount. In fact, the evidence presented here indicates a long memory discount process implying in most cases nonstationarity with mean-reversion, a result 27 which could be the outcome of …tting a linear model to any of a number of possible nonlinear processes, for example a bounded random walk. A process of this kind would be consistent both with the anecdotal evidence and also with the detailed estimates of G-T. To make the mechanism explicit, nonlinearity tests were applied to the discount process for four of the ITC dataset, resulting in strong rejection of the null hypothesis of linearity. 
